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Margaret L. Moses*
Arbitration agreements remove disputes from our court system to a
private system of justice, paid for by the participants. Although
arbitration can have certain advantages over litigation, such as
confidentiality, speed, flexibility, and ability of the parties to choose the
arbitrators, such a forum also has disadvantages. At particular risk of
being disadvantaged is the consumer, who may be unaware that by
agreeing to an arbitration clause she has given up her right to a jury
trial, and she will pay higher fees for the arbitral process than she would
have to pay as court fees in litigation. Moreover, she will have no right
to an appeal on the merits of the case, and may be prohibited from
bringing her action as a class action. 1
Although a party's consent is supposed to be required in order for the
dispute to be resolved in a private forum, in many consumer
transactions, there is no willing and knowing consent to arbitration.
Adhesion contracts that are imposed on consumers by banks, telephone
companies, credit card companies, pest control companies, and a myriad
of other vendors and service providers are neither read nor signed by
most consumers. Nonetheless, the arbitration provisions in such
contracts-referred to as pre-dispute arbitration clauses-are regularly
upheld by the courts. 2 This article will focus on how the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act in a way that undermines
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Sternlight, Class
Action].
2. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 331 (1996) (commenting on five Supreme Court decisions in 1994 and 1995 concerning
commercial arbitration law); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward
Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996)
(discussing the role of consent in arbitration agreements); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 669 (2001) [hereinafter Stemlight, Mandatory Binding] (discussing cases that have
upheld such provisions); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 707 (1996) [hereinafter
Sternlight, Panacea] (suggesting congressional changes to the FAA to protect the weaker parties
in arbitration).
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consumer protection, in particular by holding that states' attempts to
limit arbitration abuses will in most instances be preempted by the
Federal Arbitration Act.3
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION
OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
The imposition of an arbitration requirement by adhesion contracts
appears to go far beyond what the drafters of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA" or "Act") envisioned when the Act was passed in 1925. At
that point, courts were refusing to enforce arbitration agreements. The
FAA was passed in order for written arbitration agreements to be
"enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 4  Legislative history suggests that the
drafters of the FAA envisioned arbitration between merchants of
roughly equal bargaining power, and specifically did not believe the Act
provided for imposition of arbitration through adhesion contracts.5
Despite Congress' concern over limiting the scope of the FAA, the
United States Supreme Court, over the last few decades, has greatly
expanded that scope. First, the Court has announced a federal policy
favoring arbitration and requiring that "any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."6 Second,
it has held that the FAA's coverage extends to the full extent of
Congress' power under the commerce clause.7 Third, it has held that the
FAA applies to actions brought in state court. 8 Fourth, the Court has
found that even statutory rights such as those under employment
3. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that the FAA preempts a
state law requiring that a notice of arbitration be given on the first page of a contract).
4. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & West Supp. 2004).
5. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Black discussed legislative history of the FAA as follows:
[Members of Congress] expressed opposition to a law which would enforce even a
valid arbitration provision contained in a contract between parties of unequal
bargaining power. Senator Walsh cited insurance, employment, construction, and
shipping contracts as routinely containing arbitration clauses and being offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees. He noted that such
contracts 'are really not voluntarily [sic] things at all' because 'there is nothing for the
man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by
the court. .. .' He was emphatically assured by the supporters of the bill that it was not
their intention to cover such cases.
Id.
6. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
7. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
8. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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discrimination laws, 9  anti-trust laws1°  and securities laws, are
arbitrable." Finally, it has interpreted the FAA to preempt state laws
protective of weaker parties subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
adhesion contracts. 
12
The effect of this expansion of the FAA's scope is dramatic. Large
portions of our society have lost access to the courts and to juries for
many kinds of disputes. In many cases, arbitration clauses either
expressly prohibit, or are found to prohibit class actions, 13 which
sometimes provide the only economically effective way to bring a small
consumer claim. A consumer who loses an arbitration has no right to an
appeal on the merits, which means that as to errors of fact or law, the
arbitral F4rocess is not subject to any supervisory function by our court
system. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that states cannot
challenge this major displacement of disputes into the private sector,
except through those contract defenses common to all contracts.
15
Where arbitration is part of the bargain between parties of equal
strength, it can be assumed that the parties have determined that the
advantages of arbitration outweigh the disadvantages. This is not true,
however, when one side simply imposes arbitration upon the other. 
16
9. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991) (enforcing agreement
to arbitrate employment discrimination claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967).
10. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding
that anti-trust claims could be arbitrated in international transactions).
11. See generally Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (holding that securities claims are arbitrable); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act are
arbitrable under the FAA); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (holding that an
alleged trademark violation under the Securities Exchange Act is arbitrable).
12. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). See generally Stemlight,
Panacea, supra note 2 (extensively discussing the Supreme Court's decisions expanding the
scope of the FAA).
13. See generally Sternlight, Class Actions, supra note 1 (discussing the growing trend of
arbitration agreements prohibiting class actions in any venue).
14. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & West. Supp. 2004) (stating that a court may only vacate an
arbitration award on grounds of procedural inadequacy or arbitrator misconduct). But see JACK J.
COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 303-06 (1997) (noting that courts have created, although rarely applied,
some additional grounds for overturning an award, such as manifest disregard of the law and an
arbitrary and capricious award).
15. See generally Doctor's Assoc., Inc., 517 U.S. at 685-86 (holding that only generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability can invalidate an
arbitration agreement).
16. There are numerous articles suggesting that this privatized system of justice, when
imposed through adhesion contracts, is inferior to our court system of justice. See, e.g.,
Carrington & Haagen, supra note 2, at 402 (stating that if legislation resembling the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the FAA had been presented to the 1925 Congress, it would not
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II. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
This Article will focus on one aspect of the Supreme Court's
expansive interpretation of the FAA which undermines consumer
protection: its holding that arbitration agreements must be enforced
unless there is a ground for non-enforcement that applies to all
contracts, such as fraud. This interpretation severely restricts a state's
ability to regulate potential abuses of arbitration. If state legislation
singles out arbitration for special treatment, according to the Supreme
Court, the legislation is preempted by the FAA. In Doctor's Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto,17 for example, the Supreme Court found that the FAA
preempted a state law in Montana that required notice of arbitration to
be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the
contract." 18  Casarotto, a Subway franchisee in Montana, sought tolitigate a dispute arising under a franchise agreement that contained an
arbitration clause, but lacked the required notice. 19 The Montana
Supreme Court found the notice requirement was valid, and was not
preempted by the FAA, because application of Montana's notice
requirement would not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.20
The purpose of the Montana law was simply "that before arbitration
agreements are enforceable, they be entered knowingly." 21
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the FAA pre-empted
Montana's law.22 The language of Section 2 of the FAA provides that
written arbitration agreements are enforceable except upon grounds for
the revocation of any contract. 23 According to the Court, this language
means that state laws cannot single out arbitration provisions for any
have been assured of a single vote; and further noting that current interpretation enables those
with economic power to diminish enforceability of the rights of consumers, patients, employees,investors, franchisees and shopkeepers); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory
Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIz. L. REV.1069, 1092 (1998) (finding that reform is needed to make arbitration agreements truly voluntary);
Sterlight, Mandatory Binding, supra note 2 (noting that courts fail to employ traditional jurytrial waiver analysis when deciding arbitration cases); Stemlight, Panacea, supra note 2, at 712(stating that Congress should act "to prevent companies from using arbitration as a tool of
oppression, rather than to achieve justice"); Eric Weiner, Even in Victory: Darcy Ting Defeated
AT&T, Yet the Consumer-At-Large Again Has Lost, 4 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1(2002), available at http://www.cardozojcr.com/vol4nol/notes02.hmlA (stating that arbitration
process available to consumers is fundamentally unfair).
17. Doctor's Assoc., Inc., 517 U.S. at 685-86.
18. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(4) (1999).
19. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 932-33 (Mont. 1994).
20. Id. at 938-39 (citing Volt Info. Sci. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)).
21. Id. at 939.
22. Doctor's Assoc., Inc., 517 U.S. at 685-86.
23. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & West Supp. 2004).
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special treatment. 24  Rather, the only defenses to enforcing an
arbitration clause are the generally available contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability. 25 The Court indicated it was
complying with the intent of Congress to place arbitration clauses "upon
the same footing as other contracts."
26
A. The Supreme Court's Interpretation Does Not Treat
Arbitration Clauses Like Any Other Contract
The premise of this Article is that the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the FAA does not place arbitration on the same footing as other
contracts. The Court's view that the Montana law was preempted
because it singled out arbitration for special treatment ignores four
important considerations. First, the Court looked at the Montana law in
isolation, rather than considering whether the law was consistent with
the state's policy and practice of regulating contracts generally.
Second, it did not consider the intent of the legislation. Third, it did not
24. Doctor's Assoc., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687.
25. Id. (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)); Rodriguez de
Quijas, v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989); Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222-26 (1987).
26. Doctor's Assoc., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
511 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-536 (1924))).
The decisions leading up to Doctor's Associates, Inc. include the following: First, in Southland
Corporation v. Keating, the Court held that Section 2 of the FAA applied in state as well as
federal courts, and that Congress "withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for
the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (finding that a state legislature had no power to designate
an area of law-such as claims for wages-where parties were prohibited from resolving their
disputes by arbitration). Second, in Perry v. Thomas, in a dispute over a sales commission, the
Court found that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empted a California statute which permitted the
plaintiff to sue for wages despite an agreement to arbitrate. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987). Section 229 of the California Labor Code provided that actions for the collection of
wages could be maintained "without regard to the existence of any private agreement to
arbitrate." CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971). The Court held that state law can only govern
issues of the validity, revocability and enforceability of contracts generally, but cannot focus
solely on the agreement to arbitrate. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492. Finally, in Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, the Court stated:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law
principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic
terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The
Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place
arbitration clauses on an unequal 'footing,' directly contrary to the Act's language and
Congress' intent.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (citing Volt Info. Sci. v. Stanford
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)).
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recognize the right of the state to deal with the perceived harms of
adhesion contracts that impose an arbitration requirement, and that
deprive consumers of the right to a jury trial, without their knowledge or
consent. Fourth, the Court did not appear to give the same deference to
core federalism principles that it has claimed to espouse in other
contexts.
1. Treating Arbitration Clauses Differently
from Other Contract Clauses
In holding that a Montana law requiring a conspicuous notice of
arbitration was preempted by the FAA, the Supreme Court did not treat
arbitration the same as other contracts. States have typically required
certain provisions in contracts to be conspicuous. In the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC" or the "Code") for example, a number of
contract provisions are required to be conspicuous. Any attempt to
exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability, for
example, must be conspicuous. 27 The UCC even defines "conspicuous"
in Article 1 so that it can be interpreted uniformly throughout the Code,
whenever the law requires a contract provision to be conspicuous. 28 In
determining that the FAA preempted a state statute from making the
notice of an arbitration provision conspicuous, even though a state could
require any other provision of a contract to be conspicuous, the Court
has put arbitration provisions on a very different footing from other
contract provisions. The Court's position seems at odds with its earlier
statement, in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing, that "the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make
arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more
so. ',29 If states can require other contract provisions to be conspicuous,
27. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2004) ("[T]o exclude ... the implied warranty of merchantability ...
the language must mention merchantability and in case of a record must be conspicuous."). A
number of other requirements of conspicuousness are found either in the Code provisions or in
the Official Comments. Section 2A-214(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code on leases requires
that exclusion of any warranty be "in a record and be conspicuous." U.C.C. § 2A-214(2) (2004).
Section 2A-303(8) provides, "In a consumer lease, to prohibit the transfer of an interest of a party
under the lease contract or to make a transfer an event of default, the language must be specific,
by a record, and conspicuous." U.C.C. § 2A-303(7) (2004). Other requirements of
conspicuousness are found in U.C.C. §§ 3-104(d); 3-31 1(b),(c)(I), as well as in Articles 7 and 8.
28. Section 1-201(10) provides as follows:
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in
capitals ... is conspicuous. Language in the body of the form is "conspicuous" if it is
in larger or other contrasting type or color ....
U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (2004).
29. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,404 n.12 (1967).
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but not arbitration provisions, then arbitration provisions are more
enforceable than other contract provisions, because states cannot put the
same limitations on their enforceability. The Montana law, therefore,
appeared to put arbitration on the same footing as other contract notice
provisions. States can, and do, require that particular contract
provisions be made conspicuous, based on a state's own view of what
its state contract law should be.
The Supreme Court, however, has provided a very strained
interpretation of Section 2 of the FAA. In a number of decisions
interpreting the FAA, it has italicized "any," so the final clause of
Section 2 is written as follows: "save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."3 The word "any" is in
italics to emphasize the Court's view that "any" actually means "all."
In other words, the Court's position is that for grounds to be available to
render an arbitration provision unenforceable, such grounds must be
"applicable to contracts generally," 31 and therefore potentially
applicable to all contracts. Thus, grounds such as fraud,
unconscionability, and duress could be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements, because they could also be applied to invalidate contracts
generally. 32  Montana's conspicuousness requirement, on the other
hand, according to the Court, "conditions the enforceability of
arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement
not applicable to contracts generally."
33
In enacting the FAA, Congress specifically used the term "any," not
"all." Therefore, a requirement of conspicuousness could condition the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement, because it is a requirement that
also conditions enforcement of other contracts. Conspicuousness-
when required by law to put parties on notice of certain provisions-is
certainly a ground that exists at law or equity and is applied to many
types of contract clauses, not just to arbitration. The result of the
Supreme Court's rule, however, is that while any other term of a
contract can be required by a state legislature to be made conspicuous,
an arbitration provision cannot. This does not put arbitration on the
same footing as other contracts, but gives more protection to arbitration
provisions than to other provisions under contract law.
30. Doctor's Assoc., Inc., 517 U.S. at 686; Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 281; Perry, 482
U.S. at 492 n.9; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.
31. Doctor's Assoc., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687.
32. Id.
33. Id.
20051
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2. Ignoring the Intent of the Legislation
What is disturbing about the Court's rationale in Doctor's Associates
is that the Court made no attempt to see if the particular statute impeded
or interfered with the purpose of the FAA, which is to render arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts. Nor did the Court make
any effort to avoid federal encroachment in an area such as contract law
that has been typically a matter of state law. The intent of the Montana
legislature was not to interfere with the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, but to make sure that its citizens knew when an arbitration
provision was included in a contract.34 This intent is consistent with
promoting arbitration, since a core principle underlying arbitration is
that it is consensual.35 The Montana notice requirement does not
conflict with the goals and policies of the FAA by simply trying to
ensure "that before arbitration agreements are enforceable, they be
entered knowingly." 36
3. Not Acknowledging the Special Characteristics
of Adhesion Contracts
Courts have traditionally treated adhesion contracts (standard form
contracts), differently from other contracts. When the parties do not
negotiate the terms of standard form contracts, but rather the stronger
party imposes terms upon the weaker, courts may deny effect to terms
that are unexpected.3' Courts recognize that parties may not read
detailed mass-produced standard form contracts, nor understand them if
they do.38 The common law has developed a doctrine of reasonable
expectations, to the effect that a party should not be held to a term of an
adhesion contract if the term is unexpected.39 In adhesion contracts,
courts determine unexpectedness to some extent by whether the term is
conspicuous. Because of the general contract principle that
inconspicuous unexpected clauses are not enforceable, a legislature's
determination, like the determination by a common law court, that an
arbitration provision should be conspicuous appears to be within the
scope of applicability of general contract principles.
This argument was made but not accepted in Doctor's Associates.
The Court acknowledged the argument in a footnote, but stated that the
34. Uniform Arbitration Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5 (2003).
35. Volt Info. Sci. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) ("[T]he FAA
does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.").
36. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994).
37. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
38. See id. at 175 (discussing use of boiler-plate clauses in form contracts).
39. Id. at 176; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, cmt. f(1981).
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Montana Supreme Court had not asserted as a basis for its decision "a
generally applicable principle of 'reasonable expectations' governing
any standard form contract term.' 4°  Whether or not the Montana
Supreme Court asserted the doctrine as a basis for decision, it should
still be relevant to an analysis of the language of Section 2 of the FAA.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations, requiring certain provisions to
be conspicuous to be enforceable, certainly appears to fit within the
requirements of Section 2 that written arbitration provisions are
"enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
'4 1
Another issue which should be considered with respect to adhesion
contracts is that when a party "agrees" to arbitration, that party is giving
up a constitutional right to a jury trial. Many commentators have
argued that the standard for waiving the right to a jury (when that right
is given up via an arbitration agreement), should be voluntary and
knowing. 42 The Supreme Court has never recognized the relevance of
the Seventh Amendment to arbitration, and lower courts tend to ignore
the issue of whether parties to an arbitration agreement found in an
adhesion contract have validly waived their constitutional right to a jury
trial. Lower courts have enforced standard form contracts containing
arbitration clauses even if the parties have not read the agreements.
4
The rationale for not requiring a knowing and voluntary consent to such
waiver, if one is given, tends to be either that arbitration is "favored,"
44
or that once parties agree to have their dispute resolved in a non-arbitral
forum, a court does not have to apply normal waiver criteria.
45
40. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 n.3 (1996) (suggesting possibly
that a state could enact a law that would pass muster under the FAA by asserting as a basis for the
law a generally applicable principle of contract law).
41. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & West Supp. 2004). Of course one could argue that having an
arbitration clause in an adhesion contract is not unexpected. Yet, that depends upon the
sophistication of the consumer. A state should have the power to determine whether an
arbitration clause in an adhesion contract is one which is expected by the average consumer.
42. See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 2, at 331 (commenting on five Supreme Court
decisions on commercial arbitration); Stempel, supra note 2, at 1381 (discussing the role of
consent in arbitration agreements); Sternlight, Mandatory Binding, supra note 2, at 669
(discussing arbitration agreements in relation to the Seventh Amendment); Sternlight, Panacea,
supra note 2, at 707 (analyzing potential changes in the FAA to protect weaker parties).
43. See, e.g., Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984),
(noting that "though perhaps not contemplated by the Piersons when they signed the contract,
loss of the right to a jury trial is a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to
arbitrate").
44. See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285-87 (9th Cir. 1988)
(discussing the federal policy favoring arbitration).
45. See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that Congress intended to require mandatory submission to customer-oriented
2005]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 36
Yet, contract disputes resolved by arbitration are typically matters for
which there is a right to trial by jury. The drafters of the FAA assured
Congress that the FAA would not impair the right to a jury trial,
because that right must be voluntarily and validly waived when disputes
are submitted to arbitration. 46  For that constitutional right to be taken
away without the knowledge or understanding of the individual is quite
a significant diminution in a protection that is supposed to be
constitutionally guaranteed. 47 State law should be able to ensure that a
party validly gave its consent to waive a jury trial right before it permits
enforcement of an arbitration clause. Even if the state law does not
have the same consent requirement for other contract clauses, such as
clauses governing warranties or limitations of liability, it should be able
to require closer scrutiny of consent to arbitration because the
consequences of an agreement to arbitrate have a constitutional
dimension not present in the consent to any other clause in the contract,
or in the consent to the contract as a whole.
4. Not Giving Deference to Core Federalism Principles
In infringing upon the state power to regulate contracts containing
arbitration clauses, the Court appears to be in conflict with its own
declared policy of respecting the core principles of federalism.48  That
policy provides that if federal statutes are ambiguous, they are not
interpreted to displace state law.49  Rather, the Court should be
arbitration); see also Stermlight, Mandatory Binding, supra note 2, at 669 (further discussing
whether courts should be required to apply normal waiver criteria).
46. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
47. The right to a civil jury is protected in federal courts by the Seventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, and in almost all state courts by state constitutions, with two exceptions,
Louisiana and Colorado. In those states the right to a civil jury in state court is provided
respectively by state law and by court rule. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5 (2003) (updating civil
procedure rule 38); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN., arts. 1731, 1732 (West 1990); Setchell v.
Dellacroce, 454 P.2d 804, 806 (Colo. 1969) (en banc).
48. The present Court has, in the name of federalism, limited the power of Congress under the
commerce clause, and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting Congressional power under the Commerce Clause); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting Congressional power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Further, the court has created a doctrine of state sovereign immunity
well beyond the Eleventh Amendment. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding
that a law adopted by Congress exceeded the scope of Congress's section 5 power and thus could
not be used to sue state governments).
49. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 292 (1995) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ.,
dissenting) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 464 (1991)). See also Allied-Bruce
Terminix, 513 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "'where ... the field which
Congress is said to have pre-empted' includes areas that have 'been traditionally occupied by the
States,' congressional intent to supersede state laws must be 'clear and manifest."' (citations
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"absolutely certain" that Congress intended such displacement before
giving preemptive effect to a federal statute.
50
It is difficult to understand how the Court can be absolutely certain
that the FAA should displace a law requiring notice for an arbitration
provision, when there is substantial legislative history suggesting that
the FAA was not even intended to apply to the states. 51 Moreover, the
legislative history also strongly indicates that the FAA was never
intended to apply to arbitration provisions in adhesion contracts.
52
B. Extent to Which States Can Regulate Arbitration
Given the Supreme Court's position, however, that a law singling out
arbitration for special treatment will be preempted by the FAA, to what
extent, if any, can states regulate arbitration? The Court has
acknowledged that in the FAA, Congress did not foreclose the states
from all regulation of arbitration.5  As it noted in Allied-Bruce
Terminix v. Dobson, "[s]tates may regulate contracts, including
arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles."
54
Thus, under the Supreme Court's formulation, would it be possible
omitted)).
50. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 292 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (quoting
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464).
51. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O'Conner & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting) ("One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's. That history
establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute,
applicable only in federal courts"). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland:
Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
101, 165 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court correctly decided Southland). Although
Professor Drahozal provides support from the legislative history of the FAA for the majority
decision in Southland, which applies the FAA in state courts, he acknowledges that he "do[es] not
claim that the legislative history of the FAA unambiguously demonstrates that Congress intended
the Act to apply in state court." Id.
52. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (citing legislative history of the FAA and
Federal policy favoring arbitration).
53. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 281.
54. Id. In Volt Information Sciences v. Stanford, the Court, in deciding that California
arbitration law, chosen by the parties, was not preempted by the FAA, stated:
The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration. But even when Congress has not
completely displaced state regulation in an area, state law may nonetheless be pre-
empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law-that is, to the extent
that it 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' The question before us, therefore, is whether application
of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1281.2(c) to stay arbitration under this contract in
interstate commerce, in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement itself,
would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. We conclude that it would not.
Volt Info. Sci. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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for a state to make the requirement of conspicuousness applicable to
arbitration in a way that would not offend the FAA? If one followed the
logic of the Court's reasoning, it would seem that for the
conspicuousness requirement to apply to contracts generally, the state
law would have to provide that most, if not all contract terms be
conspicuous. Making every term conspicuous, of course, renders no
term conspicuous, undercutting the purpose of the requirement, and
making the "general applicability" doctrine ludicrous in this context.
What if the state amended the UCC, as adopted in that state, to
include arbitration as one of the provisions-like disclaimers of
warranties-that must be conspicuous? As part of the sales law of that
state, would the provision pass muster under the FAA? Is the state sales
law sufficiently "generally applicable" to contracts so that the
arbitration provision would not be preempted? The answer should be
that states have the power to regulate matters affecting contracts within
their states, and should be able to protect consumers from oppressive
provisions imposed on them by adhesion contracts with respect to
arbitration as well as other contract provisions. In the Court's view, its
holding in Doctor's Associates focused on a state law that singled out
arbitration for special treatment. 55 This holding should not be extended
to apply to every provision in a statutory scheme that would happen to
mention arbitration, when that statutory scheme also deals with
contracts generally.
Moreover, could a state enact a law which says that all waivers of a
constitutional right to a jury trial must be conspicuous, in writing and
signed in order for the waiver to be effective? Such a law would not
specifically target arbitration. It would be generally applicable to all
contracts which contained such a waiver, either by a clause that
specifically stated that the right to jury trial was waived, or that said the
dispute was to be resolved by arbitration. Because the law would not
mention arbitration, it should escape the reach of Doctor's Associates.
But it is not clear from Doctor's Associates whether a court would find
such a law preempted by the FAA. A court could find that such a law
had an effect on arbitration, and that it was not "generally applicable"
to contracts. 56 Extending Doctor's Associates to preempt such a law
55. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996).
56. For example, the Ninth Circuit found that the FAA preempted a California statute that
prohibited resolution of franchise disputes outside California, even though the statute applied to
both arbitration and litigation. Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 890-92 (9th Cir.
2001). The court noted that since the California provision "applies only to forum selection
clauses and only to franchise agreements; it therefore does not apply to 'any contract."' Id. at
890.
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would, however, be a dramatic interference with a state's attempt to
protect a right that is constitutionally guaranteed under the federal
constitution and the constitution of almost every state.
57
III. POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The Supreme Court and the lower courts appear to have imperfectly
sorted out Congress' desire to have arbitration be on the same footing as
other contracts. The drafters of the FAA simply wanted arbitration
agreements which were freely and knowingly entered into between
parties of equal bargaining power to be enforced by the courts, just like
other contracts. This rather straight-forward aim has been distorted to
permit arbitration to displace court proceedings without the knowledge
or consent of the weaker party to an adhesion contract, thereby denying
court access and jury trials for an enormous segment of disputes.
The Supreme Court claims to treat arbitration agreements the same
when it in fact treats them differently. It is not treating arbitration
agreements the same when it refuses to allow states to require that
notice of arbitration be conspicuous, although the state could legally
require any other contract provision to be conspicuous.
The courts are permitting the removal of large numbers of disputes
from our system of justice into private forums, without the consent,
agreement, or knowledge of the participants. While privatized justice
may function well enough when the parties choose it, knowing full well
what their options are, when it is imposed upon unwitting participants, it
thwarts both our system of justice and the intentions of Congress.
Considering the Court's unwillingness to permit regulation of
arbitration in adhesion contracts, the next logical step is legislative
reform. A number of scholars have suggested proposals to reform the
FAA.58 Various kinds of federal legislation could help realign the FAA
with its drafters' original goals, and thereby limit the oppressive use of
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts. The following are potential
workable solutions:
57. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing the right to a civil trial by jury).
58. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REv. 1237 (2001) (suggesting reform of arbitration to
avoid the destruction of consumer rights); William W. Park, The Specificity of International
Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241 (2003) (suggesting
that the FAA should separate domestic and international arbitration); Jeremy Senderowicz,
Consumer Arbitration and Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers' Informed
Consent to Arbitration Clauses in Form Contracts, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 275 (1999)
(suggesting a change in the FAA that balances consumers being forced to arbitrate with the
benefits of arbitration); Speidel, supra note 16, at 1069 (suggesting that the FAA be revised to
provide incentives for improvement in transactions between individuals and corporations).
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A. Adopt a European-Style System
Congress could adopt legislation that would protect consumers from
adhesion contract arbitration agreements by prohibiting such
agreements unless both parties agreed to arbitrate post-dispute. This is
the approach taken in Europe. The EU Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts essentially prevents companies from requiring a
consumer to resolve future disputes through binding arbitration, by
providing that except for subject matter and price, any non-negotiated
term in a consumer contract can be challenged as unfair.59
B. Limit the Scope of the FAA
Alternatively, federal legislation could clarify the scope of the FAA's
preemption of state laws, limiting preemption to instances where a state
law seriously interfered with making arbitration agreements
enforceable. Such legislation should specifically permit states to protect
their citizens against the harms of arbitration in any areas where the
state found such safeguards were needed.
C. Limit Applicability of the FAA
Federal legislation could also restrict the application of the FAA to
federal courts. The Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corporation
v. Keating to make the FAA applicable in state courts was highly
controversial in light of legislative history strongly indicating that
Congress' intent was "to require federal, not state, courts to respect
arbitration agreements." 60  At this point, most states have their own
state arbitration laws, and state courts no longer resist enforcement of
arbitration agreements.61 Freeing the states from possible preemption
by the FAA would permit them to institute proper controls on the use of
59. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29; see also Christopher R. Drahozal &
Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States, 28 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 357 (2002) (discussing consumer arbitration in the European Union); Jean
R. Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer
and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002)(discussing whether or not the United States' approach to arbitration is a method for corporations
to control public policy).
60. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 23 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. See David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 31, and n.55(2004) (noting that "most states have rigorously enforced arbitration agreements under state
statues" and that "[florty-seven states and the District of Columbia have arbitration-enforcement
statutes creating mechanisms similar to the FAA") (citing 5 Ian R. McNeill, et al., Federal
Arbitration Law: Agreements, Awards & Remedies under the Federal Arbitration Act 41-44 app.
I (5th ed. 1994)).
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arbitration in an adhesion contract.
D. Require Express Consent to an Arbitration Clause
Federal legislation could require that no arbitration agreement is valid
unless the agreement is in writing and signed by the other party. This is
a requirement found in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, which has been adopted by many countries.
62
The FAA currently requires arbitration agreements to be in writing, but
there is no requirement that the agreement be signed. The lack of a
signature requirement permits credit card companies and others to
impose an arbitration requirement in the fine print they send out with
billing inserts or other information, without any need for the customer
to even read the "agreement." A signature requirement might at least
alert parties to the fact of the arbitration agreement, particularly if it
were combined with a conspicuousness requirement, similar to the
requirement in the Montana law struck down in Doctor's Associates.
E. Allocate the Costs of Arbitration
Finally, federal legislation could require that any business choosing
to include an arbitration clause in its standard form contract with a
consumer must pay the cost of the arbitration. 63 Imposing costs on the
stronger party would still not alleviate many of the problems associated
with arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, but if combined with
other kinds of legislation, such as the proposals discussed above, it
could help level the playing field.
IV. CONCLUSION
Depriving large numbers of consumers of access to our court system
without their consent could not have been the intent of the drafters of
the FAA. Permitting contracts of adhesion to displace our system of
justice with a privatized system not chosen by the parties, not subject to
review on the merits, with costs imposed on a party who never chose
the system, with constitutionally based jury trial rights deemed to be
waived despite a lack of knowledge or consent-this is the current state
of the law under the FAA. This does not appear to be the state of the
62. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Article 7(2) (June 21, 1985), available at http://www.uncitral
.org/en-index.htm.
63. See Julia A. Scarpino, Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Disputes: A Proposal to Ease
the Financial Burden on Low-Income Consumers, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 679,
680 (2002) (proposing a court rule that would require businesses that forced consumers to
arbitrate to pay the costs involved in mandatory arbitration).
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law intended by the Congress which adopted the FAA. It is time for
legislation that gives consumers a choice as to which system of justice
they prefer. Privatized justice, when not chosen by the parties, is not
justice.
